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RECENT CASES
Appeal and Error-Amending a Statement of Points Submitted with the Short Statemeat of Facts. In order that he mght effect an appeal from a denial of his pre-trial
motion to dismiss, D filed a short statement of facts containing only those matters and
proceedings relating to the motion for dismssal. Pursuant to Rule 9 (2) RULES OF TH3E
SuPRwxn CouRT, D also submitted a brief statement of the points on which he would
rely on the appeal. The statement of points was so phrased as to indicate that D was
appealing not only upon the ruling on his motion to dismiss, but from every ruling
made by the trial court. After the ninety-day period allowed for filing the statement of
points had passed, D amended the statement of points to indicate an appeal only from
the denial of the motion to dismiss. Held. the statement of points cannot be amended
and the amendment made in this case is stricken. Because the original statement of
points covered all the rulings of the trial court and the statement of facts failed to contain all of the matters necessary for a review of all of the rulings below, the statement
of facts must be stricken and the judgment affirmed. Falk v. Ste nbe'k, 130 Wash.
Dec. 56, 190 P.(2d) 747 (1948).
An appellant must file, with a short statement of facts, a statement of the points
upon which he wishes to rely. Rule 9 (2), supra. The short statement of facts must be
certified by the trial court, but only after the parties have had an opportunity to be
heard on the question of the materiality and the adequacy of the proposed statement
of facts. REu. Rav. STAT. § 398 et seq. [P.P.C. § 78-1 et seq.], Livermore v. Northwest
Air Lines, Inc., 6 Wn.(2d) 1, 106 P.(2d) 578 (1940). The principal case rules that
only the statement of facts may be altered or amended during the precertification proceedings. When the statement of facts contains all the matters and proceedings relevant
to the particular points the appellant wishes to review, but his statement of points does
not clearly identify those particular points, the ambiguity cannot be remedied by
rephrasing the statement of points.
To support the decision in the principal case the Supreme Court said that the
appellant would have an unfair advantage if he could cite many errors when he intended
to argue only a few. However, an appellant gains no advantage by submitting a statement of points which indicates that he wishes to appeal all of the rulings of the trial
court if his statement of facts contains matter relevant to only one ruling of the trial
court; the discrepancy is patent. The respondent and the trial judge are entitled to
know, when a short statement of facts is submitted by the appellant, exactly what
issues the appellant will raise on appeal. It does not follow, however, that an appellant
should be bound by the statement of points as originally filed. When the statement is
filed with the trial court, the respondent is given an opportunity to object to any discrepancy. REm. Rxv. STAT. § 389 et seq. [P.P.C. § 47-17]. The court is not bound to
certify a proposed statement of facts if it does not contain all of the matters and proceedings both parties consider necessary for this particular appeal. R~lS. REv. STAT.
§ 391 [P.P.C. § 47-17]. If the statement of points is ambiguous, the judge, respondent,
and appellant can reasonably be expected to discover that ambiguity. And they should
be free to resolve it in whatever manner seems reasonable to them.
The present rule 9(2), supra, does not specifically provide that the statement of
points can be modified pending certifitation. This writer suggests that the rule should
be revised, for the present rule unduly restricts the trial judge and the appellant during
the precertification proceedings in the trial court. The parties, at that stage of the
appeal, are in a position to expedite and facilitate the appeal if they are free to identify
and define satisfactorily to themselves the particular issues to be presented to the
Supreme Court for review.
H.R.V
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Tort--Guest and Host Statute-No Protection When An Unlawful Act. P brought
suit to recover damages for death of a minor son. The deceased, eight years, three
months old, sustained injuries causing his death when he jumped from the running
board of a mail delivery truck where he had been riding with the knowledge of D,
the driver. D admitted knowledge of a statute (REM. Rsv. STAT. §6360-115 [P.P.C.
§ 295-81]) making it unlawful to transport persons on the outside of a vehicle. The
jury found that the boy had not been contributorily negligent and gave judgment for
P D appeals, contending liability is avoided by the "host and guest" statute. (REM.
REv. STAT. § 6360-121 [P.P.C. § 295-95]). Held. affirmed. D cannot claim protection
of the guest statute when his own unlawful act has created the alleged relationship.
Upchurch v. Hubbard, 129 Wash. Dec. 519, 188 P. (2d) 82 (1948).
The principal purpose of the guest statute is to prevent collusive suits for damages.
Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.(2d) 615 (1936). In determining who are guests
within the meaning of the statute, the enactment should not be extended beyond the
correction of the evils which induced it. Thuente v. Hart Motors, 234 Iowa 1294, 15
N.W.(2d) 622 (1944). Recognizing these principles our court may have felt that D,
in the Upchurch case, should not be exempted from liability.
In reaching the conclusion that the guest statute was inapplicable because of the
unlawfulness of D's act, the court selected an unfortunate basis of decision. A better
ground might have been the boy's lack of capacity to enter a guest-host relationship.
In Taylor v. Tauge, 17 Wn.(2d) 533, 136 P.(2d) 176 (1943) the court recognized
that the guest-host concept requires an offer by the host, or request by the guest,
followed by an acceptance. Presumably some capacity is necessary to make such
acceptance. This problem has never been considered by our court. Comments, 12
WAsH. L. REv. 138 (1937), 15 WAsH. L. Rxv. 87 (1940). Having found the boy too
immature to be contributorily negligent, the jury might also have found him to immature to accept a ride and "assume the risk of all injuries, except those intentionally
caused by the driver" as apparently required by Parker v. Taylor, 196 Wash. 22, 81
P.(2d) 806 (1938). The fact that the guest statute does not make an exception in
favor of minors, as pointed out in Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 Atl. 323, 94
A.L.R. 1206 (1934) and Tilghnan v. Rightor, 199 S.W.(2d) 943 (Ark, 1947) cited
in the Upchurch opinion, does not mean that a child may not lack capacity to assume
the status of a guest.
By relying on the unlawful act of D, instead of the deceased's lack of capacity, as
the reason for not applying the guest statute the court has left fertile ground for litigation. Certainly the court is not prepared to hold that a hitchhiker may recover for
injuries received in an accident caused by the operator, for this would defeat a fundamental purpose of the statute. But REM. REv. STAT. § 6360-100 [P.P.C. § 295-51] provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to solicit a ride on the highway, and
unlawful for any driver to give such person a ride upon solicitation. At page 526 of
the Upchurch opinion the court indicates that the operator is exempted from liability
only when the relationship of guest-host is a lawful one, "or at least not an unlawful
one, nor one dependent for its creation upon some unlawful act of the owner or
operator himself." Unless the court can use the fact that the driver and hitchhiker
would be in pan delicto, which was not true in the Upchurch case as the statute there
made only the act of the driver unlawful, the cases would seem indistinguishable.
L.V.R.
Property-Waste-Treble Damages. At the termination of D's lease, D removed certain fixtures and in doing so injured part of the building. P sued to recover treble
damages for waste relying on REM. REv. STAT. § 938 [P.P.C. § 103-3] as amended by

RECENT CASES
Wash. Laws 1943, c. 22, § 1. The trial court awarded only compensatory damages.
Held: reversed. The statute as amended in 1943 is mandatory in that treble damages
must be given where waste is voluntary. Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 130 Wash. Dec. 361,
191 P.(2d) 858 (1948).
Prior to the 1943 change it had been held that in spite of the language of the waste
statute, "there may be judgment for treble damages," punitive damages were unsound
in principle and not recoverable unless expressly provided for in the statute. De Lano
v. Tennent, 138 Wash. 39, 244 Pac. 273 (1926). For this reason the amendment seemingly compelling the award of treble damages in certain instances came as somewhat
of a surprise. Cross, The Amendment of the Waste Statute-Retrogresson?, 21
WAsH. L. REv. 31 (1946). In the cited comment, from which both P and D quote in
their appellate briefs, the author argues that the variance in the language of the two
parts of the statute would justify a construction that only voluntary waste should be
penalized by treble damages. The court gives some support to this contention by emphasizing the word comnnitting in the part awarding treble damages and the word
permitting in the part providing for another form of relief.
It would seem, then, that the court was on safe ground in the instant case. However,
where only permsssive waste is involved it would appear desirable, in view of the De
Lano case, to adopt the construction suggested in the above-mentioned comment and
award only compensatory damages.
R.A.C.
Death - Damages - Excessive Damages - New Trial - Future Earnings - Rate of
Discount. In Kelleher v. Porter, 129 Wash. Dec. 601, 189 P.(2d) 223 (1948) the
Court held. (1) That a verdict for $70,000 in a wrongful death action was so excessive
as unmistakably to indicate that the verdict must have been the result of passion or
prejudice and to require a new trial under R1m. Rv. STAT. § 399(5) [P.P.C. §
78-3(5)], and (2) that the discount rate to be applied in a wrongful death action in
computing the present value of future earnings is a question of fact for the jury.
Evidence had been introduced that, at the time of his death, the deceased had a life
expectancy of from thirty-five to thirty-nine years, that he was earning slightly more
than $4,000 per year, and that the present value of $4,000 per year payable in equal
monthly installments until deceased would have reached the age of sixty-five, discounted at 2% per cent, was approximately $78,000. Since this was the only actuarial
evidence in the case, it would appear that the verdict was based on this evidence rather
than being the result of passion or prejudice. But the evidence also showed that prior
to the war deceased had earned only $125 monthly, and that his present earnings were
the result of the abnormal war labor conditions and his working sixteen hours a day
and seven days a week as a sheetmetal worker and truck driver. Therefore, since those
conditions could not reasonably be expected to continued for the next thirty years, a
new trial could have been granted under Raid. REv. STAT. § 399(7) [P.P.C. § 78-3(7)],
on the ground that the evidence would not support the size of the verdict. The opinion
of the court actually demonstrates this proposition, and all the cases cited as authority
were decided on this basis, e.g., Thompson v. Fiorito, 167 Wash. 495, 9 P. (2d) 789
(1932), Vowell v. Issaquah Coal Co., 31 Wash. 103, 71 Pac. 725 (1903).
The court specifically refused to allow a remittitur. Its refusal stems from a reluctance to allow the verdict to stand as to the basic liability of D when that verdict was
determined to have been the result of passion or prejudice, Puget Sound Lumber Co.
v. Mechantcs' and Traders' Insurance Co., 168 Wash. 46, 10 P.(2d) 568 (1932). But
this is by no means a universal rule, Sutherland, Damages § 459, 460, and has been
criticized, McCormick, Damages § 19. Furthermore, the allowance of a remittitur is
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specifically provided for by REm. Pv. STAT. § 399-1 [P.P.C. § 78-5], and the only
situation mentioned in the statute is that in which the verdict is determined to have
been the result of passion or prejudice.
The holding as to the interest rate to be used in capitalizing future earnings appears
to be the first on the precise point in this state. In the main, two rules have been
adopted in other jurisdictions. The numerical weight of authority is that the legal rate
of interest must be applied. (Cases collected in 104 A.L.R. 234.) The other is that the
rate of interest available on safe investments should be applied. The latter seems more
realistic and just, McCormick, Damages § 86 note 25, and is the rule adopted for the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485,
36 S.Ct. 630, 60 L.Ed. 1117, L.R.A. 1917F, 367, 13 N.C.C.A. 673 (1916). Of the cases
applying it there appear to have been none holding that the interest rate is a matter of
law for the judge. (Cases collected in 104 A.L.R. 234.) The proper interest rate is a
question for the jury either under the evidence, Gulf, C. & S. F R. Co. v. Moser, 275
U.S. 133, 48 S.Ct. 49, 72 L.Ed. 200 (1927), or in the absence of evidence then from their
own knowledge of rates available on safe investments, Western & A. R. Co. v. Lochridge, 170 Ga. 208, 152 S.E. 474 (1930).
In Borlandv. Pactfic Meat and Packing Co., 153 Wash. 14, 279 Pac. 94 (1929) the
court held admissible evidence as to the cost of purchasing an annuity of the given
amount from standard insurance companies. Since this cost is presumably based on an
investment rate rather than the legal interest rate, the present holding seems to be but
a proper extension of the same rule and will allow evidence of actuarial tables computed with different rates of interest, leaving it to the jury to apply the one they find
proper.
J.F R.
Workmen's Compensation-Employers Within the Act. Claimant, an employee of
the Cooperative Association Naval Supply Depot, was injured while engaged in extrahazardous work. His claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
was denied by the joint board. The holding was affirmed by the superior court on the
ground that the act does not extend its coverage to nonprofit organizations. Held:
reversed. All that is necessary to be shown to bring an employer within the act is that
such employer be engaged as a regular business or trade, in the type of extralhazardous
work involved. Pitts v. Department of Labor and Industries, 130 Wash. Dec. 118, 191
P.(2d) 295 (1948).
Early cases on this point arose under REm. Rxv. STAT. § 7675 [P.P.C. § 3470] which
defined "employer" "Except when otherwise expressly stated, employer means any
person
while engaged in this state in any extrahazardous work or who contracts
with another to engage in extrahazardous work." It would seem that the words "or who
contracts with another" indicated the intention to include in the statute those persons
not engaged in business. However, the cases consistently refused to follow this interpretation. "The whole theory of the act is to the effect that it applies to a trade or business
which is operated for profit or pecuniary gain." Thurston County Chapter, American
Nat. Red Cross v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 166 Wash. 488, 492, 7 P.(2d) 577,
579 (1932). See also Carsten v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 172 Wash. 51, 19 P. (2d)
133 (1933), Dalmasso v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 181 Wash. 294, 43 P.(2d)
32 (1935).
In 1939 the statute was amended to read. "Except when otherwise expressly stated,
employer means any person
while engaged in this state in any extrahazardous
work, by way of trade or business, or who contracts with one or more workmen, the
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essence of which is the personal labor of such workman or workmen, in extrahazardous
work." Rzi. REv. STAT. (Sup.) § 7675 [P.P.C. § 709-1].
Craine v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 19 Wn.(2d) 75, 141 P.(2d) 129 (1943),
being the first case to interpret the new statute, continued to follow the rule laid down
in the previous cases. It was held that a workman injured while working for a man
building his own home was not within the act because the man was not engaged in
construction work as a business. But it is arguable that had the legislature been satisfied with the rule of the prior cases that it would have left the statute untouched.
The court in the instant case confines the Thurston rule to out-and-out charities. It
has continued, however, to ignore the latter part of the new statute, which would
appear to include, even more clearly than the old statute, not only one who is engaged
in extrahazardous work as a trade or business but also one who merely contracts personally with a workman to do extrahazardous work. It would extend even to a householder who has some casual work done upon lus premises. Perhaps the court realizes
the administrative difficulties that will occur as to the collection of premiums and
assessments from such persons and, for this reason, is hesitant to give the more obvious
interpretation to the statute. However, this is a legislative problem, not a judicial one.
W. A. R.
Quitclain Grantee's Right to Payments on Executory Contract of Sale. Grantor, H,

contracted to sell realty to X and thereafter quitclaimed his interest in the land to the
grantee, W, prior to their marriage. Subsequently the realty was awarded to the
grantor in a divorce action. The grantee sued the grantor's estate for payments made
by X to the grantor on the contract in the interval between delivery of the quitclaim
deed and the property award of the divorce court. In the alternative, the grantee
wanted the land if X had defaulted on the contract. Held: A quitclaim deed of itself
does not carry with it the right to collect payments on an outstanding executory contract of sale of the property. Since there was no evidence that the grantor intended to
assign the contract, judgment in favor of the grantor was proper. Biehn v. Lyon, 129
Wash. Dec. 692, 189 P.(2d) 482 (1948).
The court recognized that the vendor's rights in the contract and legal title may be
separated. A vendor may keep the contract right to receive payments and transfer legal
title, or he may convey legal title to one and assign the contract to another. Shelton
v.Jones, 4 Wash. 692, 30 Pac. 1061 (1892), Culmback v. Stevens, 158 Wash. 675,
291 Pac. 705 (1930). However, though the decision may be supported on other grounds,
the language indicating that a quitclain deed alone does not carry with it the right to
receive payments on an executory contract of sale seems contrary to the normal rule.
A quitclaim deed conveys whatever present title, right, or interest the grantor has
in the land. Pinkertonv. Fenelon, 131 Wis. 440, 111 N.W 220 (1905), See Annotation
44 A.L.R. 1266. Thus a conveyance of his interest by the vendor to a third party will,
as a general rule, pass the right to receive the purchase money remaining unpaid.
Lamm v. Armstrong, 95 Minn. 434, 104 N.W 304 (1907), 1 Tiffany, Real Property
(3rd Ed. 1939) § 307
The situation is closely analogous to a conveyance by a mortgagee in a "title
theory" state. It is generally held there that the right to payment passes with the
conveyance of the land in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary. Griffin v.
Wilmer, 136 Md. 623, 111 Atl. 114 (1920), Stark v. Boynton, 167 Mass. 443, 45 N.E.
764 (1897). A quitclaim deed is sufficient to assign the mortgage if there is no negotiable note or other independent evidence of the mortgage debt outstanding. Hawkins
v. Elston, 58 Colo. 400, 146 Pac. 254 (1915). Since the conveyance of a bare security
interest would be contrary to the normal expectations of the parties, the formal con-
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veyance is deemed to raise an inference that an assignment of the debt was intended
by the grantor. Walsh, Mortgages (1934) § 58.
It would seem that the reasoning of these cases is applicable to the instant case,
and in the absence of clear evidence of a contrary intention a quitclaim grantee should
receive the right to collect payments due on an executory contract of sale along with
the right to foreclose the security interest for his own benefit upon default by the
purchaser.
J. D. B.
Husband and Wife-Community Property-Conduct after Separation as Affecting
Status of Property Subsequently Acquired. Sixteen years after his separation from D,
the intestate purchased from his earnings United States savings bonds naming P as
alternate payee. In an action to determine title to these bonds, the court, en barc, held.
Despite the continuance of the marriage relation, D and the deceased had so conducted
themselves after their separation as to indicate their intention that property thereafter
acquired by either of them should be the separate property of the one acquiring it.
The bonds were, therefore, the separate property of the deceased husband. Togliatti
v. Robertson, 129 Wash. Dec. 808, 190 P. (2d) 575 (1948). Rehearing denied, 130
Wash. Dec. 355 (1948).
Shortly after the separation, an interlocutory decree of divorce had been entered
but, no final decree having been granted, it abated and became a nullity upon the
death of the husband. That point is well settled in this jurisdiction. Dougherty v.
Dougherty, 24 Wn.(2d) 811, 167 P.(2d) 467 (1946). By failing to put stress on the
entry of an interlocutory decree, the court has left intact the holding of CaliforniaWestern States Life Ins. Co. v. Jarman,, 129 Wash. Dec. 95, 185 P. (2d) 494 (1947),
to the effect that earnings subsequent to the entry of such a decree are usually community property. However, the three judges who concurred in the result in the
principal case did so on the ground that the Jarman case should be overruled, asserting
that entry of an interlocutory decree should mark that point in time after which individual acquisitions are to be considered as the separate property of the acquiring
spouse. Two judges dissented, stating that neither an entry of an interlocutory decree
nor a protracted separation should prevail over the clear language of REM. REv. STAT.
§ 6892, [P.P.C. § 1433], defining community property as all property (with certain
exceptions not pertinent here) acquired after marriage.
The precise reasoning upon which the majority bases its result is not apparent but,
consistent with the tenor of the opinion, two theories might be advanced in its support:
(1) The Washington court, as pointed out in the opinion, has given effect to alleged
informal "understandings" or agreements as to the separate status of individual acquisitions during marriage when supported by evidence of conduct cqnsistent with the
existence of such an agreement. Lanigan v. Miles, 102 Wash. 82, 172 Pac. 894 (1918),
Dobbins v. Dexter Horton & Co., 62 Wash. 423, 113 Pac. 1088 (1911), Union Securities Co. v. Smnith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 Pac. 304 (1916), McKay, Community Property
(2nd Ed. 1925) § 892. The further step of inplying such an agreement from a long continued course of conduct involves no insuperable conceptual difficulties. Perplexing
problems arise, however, in determining at what point in time such agreements become
effective and their possible retroactive effect. (2) A woman who, in good faith, though
erroneously, believes she is married is held in this state to have an equitable interest
acquired during the period of cohabitation. Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac.
1079 (1908) , Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110, 176 Pac. 22 (1918). By a parity of reasoning, a woman who, in good faith, though erroneously, believes she is not married may
be said to suffer a corresponding disability to assert a community interest in the acquisi-
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tions of the husband from whom she lives separate and apart. In the instant case, D, in
good faith, believing her marriage to have been terminated by the interlocutory decree,
contracted a void marriage with another shortly thereafter.
Whatever solace one may derive from legal analysis of the instant case is dissolved
by the elastic reservation contained in the last paragraph of the majority opimon.
'Each case must be disposed of on its own peculiar facts." This, taken in conjunction
with the wide divergence of opinion currently entertained by the members of the court,
largely undermines the importance of the case as a reliable precedent by which bench
and bar may be guded.
C.L.S.

